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References 281. Introduction
In the integration of the two Germanies two countries will be united which
differ widely in their institutional and constitutional arrangements as well as in
their monetary systems and real economic conditions. Integration therefore means
- harmonization of the institutional systems,
- introduction of a common currency and a unified monetary policy, and
- adjustment in the real economies.
In the process of integration, these three aspects of institutional harmonization,
establishing a single monetary policy and bringing the real economic conditions
closer to each other will overlap.
The final state of the integration process is a fully integrated economic union.
In the commodity markets, the law of one price will govern for tradeables. The
prices for non-tradeables such as housing and some services will differ among re-
gions. In the factor markets, one price will prevail for any given factor that is
completely mobile. Interest rates and the marginal productivity of capital will be
identical everywhere. However, prices of immobile factors of production such as
land and the environment will differ from region to region. Labor will be in an
intermediate position. Insofar as labor is completely mobile, real wages tend to
equalize; they can, however, be different when the costs of living vary over
space. When labor is only partly mobile and when preferences for specific locations
exist, real wages may be more differentiated. On the monetary side, there will be
only one currency whose value is determined by the money supply of one central
bank. The social security systems will be harmonized. The state, including the
provision of public goods and the tax system, will be homogeneous, notwithstand-
ing federal elements. Finally, the firms and the sectorial structure in the economic
union will have adjusted to the new conditions, and the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) will have caught up in income per head.
The author appreciates comments on sections of this paper from Alfred Boss,
Bert Hofman, Rolf J. Langhammer, Michael Rauscher and Klaus-Dieter Schmidt.
The report is based on information available as of May 4, 1990. New information
on economic conditions, policy decisions and changes in the points of view of the
policy makers due to new moods in the population may affect the underlying as-
sumptions of the analysis.2. The Starting Point
The starting point of the integration process can be described by the following
basic facts (see Table 1):
(i) Labor productivity in the GDR is now estimated at one-third of the West
German productivity [Siebert, 1989b; 1990c; Schmieding, 1990]. On the basis
of 1983 data, productivity in the GDR was originally put at roughly 50 per-
cent of the West German level [DIW, 1987].
1 In the latter study, pro-
ductivity was measured for a GDR before the wall came down. The poor
quality of GDR commodities, which in many cases cannot compete on the in-
ternational market, was not taken into account. The trade structure was dis-
torted towards the COMECON. Moreover, environmental costs of production
were not taken into consideration, so that productivity was lower than ex-
pressed in the numbers. This holds for environmental damages of actual pro-
duction as well as for vintage damages; especially as concerns the generation
of electricity (brown coal and atomic plants), the chemical industry, the
steel industry and, in part, other sectors such as machinery and transpor-
tation equipment. Due to rising environmental prices, energy costs are dis-
torted as well. The internalization of environmental and energy costs acts
like an oil price shock suppressing productivity.
As a rough indicator of productivity, the "foreign currency coefficient"
may be used. It is defined as costs in GDR-Marks necessary to earn one
unit of D-Mark in the trade with the West. This coefficient, which is in-
fluenced of course by a distorted price structure, rose from 2.4 (1980) to
2.9 (1985) and 4.4 (1988), indicating a real depreciation of the GDR-Mark
and a loss in productivity in the eighties.
(ii) Differences in productivity are reflected in income differences. In 1989, the
average wage income in the whole economy was M 1230 in the East and DM
3970 in the West.
(iii) Differences in the income situation are the most important reason for mi-
gration. In 1989, about 340000 inhabitants left the GDR; in the first three
9
months of 1990, the GDR lost approximately 150000 inhabitants.
Meanwhile DIW [ 1990] estimates that the productivity gap is somewhat larger than
50 percent.
2 Prior to the election on March 18, 1990, about 2000 inhabitants left per day, in
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Source: Sachverstandigenrat [1990]; Statistisches Bundesamt [1989]; Deutsche
Bundesbank [1990]; Table 2.
(iv) The present situation is also characterized by inadequate environmental qual-
ity, unsatisfactory housing and gaps in medical care.
The low level of productivity in East Germany has a number of causes:
- The capital stock in industry is largely obsolete both from the production and
the demand side. Outdated technologies are used, and output is not competitive.
- Social overhead capital in transportation and communication is deficient.
- Industry is inefficient because each branch has been organized as a well protect-
ed monopoly with clearly segmented markets. The monopolies were not checked
by competition. Ironically, the industrial structure is the result of a specializ-
ation philosophy similar to the strategic trade policy now being discussed in the
international economics literature.- Central planning has proved to be a failure because this system does not provide
the right incentives and because it does not signal the correct information on
scarcity.
The core of the problem is the low productivity in the GDR. A causal therapy
must start from this point and increase productivity. This can be done in two
ways:
(i) Labor productivity can be raised by an increase in capital, shifting the mar-
ginal productivity of labor curve upward. New capital embodies new technical
knowledge. With an increase in productivity, wages can rise. Consequently,
for an improvement to occur capital has to flow into East Germany. In a cur-
rency union, both capital and labor are mobile. In the actual case of the two
Germanies, capital alone should do the adjustment job, so that people do not
have to migrate. Thus, capital must flow into East Germany at such a high
speed and with such a great volume that people have no incentive to move.
(ii) Productivity will also be increased by giving up central planning and intro-
ducing the social market economy. Bottlenecks will disappear quickly. Firms
will no longer need large inventories in order to reduce the risk of nondeliv-
ery of essential inputs. They will then be able to rely on punctual deliveries,
thus taking advantage of the division of labor among firms. New and small
firms will raise productivity. In the short and medium run, the reorganization
of the state monopolies will imply the closing down of outdated and inefficient
production facilities.
3. Institutionai Integration
In order to integrate the two countries' divergent economic systems, the insti-
tutional setting of the two economies has to be harmonized. As in West European
integration, harmonization can be done ex ante and from above by prior agreement
or ex post by a process of institutional competition with response from below, in-
See also Erhard [1953]: "Dies ist das eigentliche Problem, die Produktivitat der
Sowjetzonenwirtschaft so rasch und so energisch zu verbessern, da8 der ProzeG
der Leis tung sang leichung auch zeitlich so kurz wie moglich bemessen werden
kann. " (Author's translation: "The real problem is how to improve the level of
productivity in the Russian-occupied zone of Germany so quickly and so
vigorously that the process of matching the economic performance with that of
the western zones takes as little time as possible. ")eluding spatial arbitrage of households and firms [Siebert, 1990e]. Institutional
competition of the two systems as a vehicle for integration saw the emigration of
340000 inhabitants in 1989, so that now the institutional setting of the GDR has to
be changed by political decisions. Institutional reforms imply
- the abandonment of central planning and the introduction of the market mechan-
ism, the determination of prices based on scarcities and world market prices to-
gether with the immediate abolishment of subsidies for tradeables (i.e., consumer
goods) and of the government's foreign trade monopoly,
- the introduction of private property rights including ownership of land and
firms,
- the privatization of state-owned firms, their reorganization and exposure to com-
petition,
- the establishment of a two-tier banking system with private banks, of a capital
market to allocate savings to the most productive investments, and of a stock
exchange to evaluate assets and to control managers,
- the development of a new tax system, the design of a new social security system
that includes unemployment insurance, and the specifying of a new arrangement
for the labor market, including a definition of the role of trade unions.
These reforms in the institutional design of the GDR become necessary if one
wants to establish a currency and an economic union. They are a conditio sine qua
non for a monetary union; they must precede the monetary union or they must be
introduced simultaneously. The government of the GDR has opted for the proce-
dure according to Article 23 of the West German constitution. In this context, a
formal treaty between the two governments is necessary in which the basic modal-
ities of the monetary, economic, social and political union will be defined. More
specifically, a transitional period is necessary in three different areas; namely, the
privatization of firms, the adjustment of the tax system and the harmonization of
the social security system.
The dismantling of the state-owned enterprises implies the reorganization of
firms into smaller units. Organizational sub-units of state monopolies should have
the option to declare themselves as independent units. Moreover, an explicit
government policy should force existing monopolies to dismantle themselves into
smaller organizational units. The shaping of new organizational units is intermixed
with the issue of ownership of firms and of the control of managers. Firms should
be privatized. The problem is by which institutional arrangement privatization can
be achieved. In principle, each resident of the GDR owns a portion of the assetsof each firm (and owns a portion of the liabilities). The allocation of property
titles to each firm to each resident would represent an equitable solution consistent
with the market economy, but it may be too complicated, causing transaction costs
that are too high. Thus, more practical approaches have to be found. However,
care must be taken that these institutional arrangements for privatization do not
perpetuate government ownership (e.g., by giving property titles to communities),
that big financial trusts with political interests (and rent-seeking activities) are
not established and that the managers are not controlled by workers' councils, but
by the capital market.
It may be difficult to apply the West German tax system to East Germany right
away. Above all, an internal revenue service does not exist. Consequently, in a
transitional period, only certain parts of the West German tax system such as the
value-added tax and excise taxes may be implemented.
The level of benefits provided by the West German social security system
cannot be introduced instantaneously in East Germany because it could not be
financed and because it would imply such a high minimum or reservation wage that
East German firms would not be competitive and labor would be unemployed.
Therefore, there must be some transitional phase in which old age pensions,
unemployment benefits and welfare payments differ between the two Germanies:
One way of achieving this is to apply the structure of the West German social
security system, but to differentiate the benefit levels. Pensions would be
determined on the basis of past and actual wages in East Germany, unemployment
benefits would be linked to the previous wage income, and other forms of social
security would take into account the cost of living (e.g., rents for housing) in
different areas. The level of social security payments would thus be different be-
tween East and West Germany.
4. Monetary Integration
There were two options for monetary integration: the transitional and the in-
stant approach. From an economist's point of view, the transitional approach with
two currencies, both possibly managed by the Bundesbank in Frankfurt, would
have had the advantage of
Ownership could be established by using the money overhang.- using the exchange rate as a shock absorber for the East German firms, thus
giving them competitiveness temporarily,
- easing the transitional difficulties involved in adapting the social security system
and in adjusting wages,
- delegating the conversion of debt, liabilities and wages to the market exchange
rate prevailing at the end of the transitional period, and uncoupling the GDR-
Mark from the European Monetary System (EMS) for the transitional period.
From the politician's point of view, there may not have been enough time avail-
able for a transitional solution. Up to now, all problems associated with a monetary
integration have focused on the choice of the conversion rate and on the conditions
for conversion. The conversion rate for currencies, debt and wages have become a
political price that was determined by the political process. The two central econ-
omic issues have been (and still are) the impact of conversion on the price level
stability in the new currency area and on the competitiveness of East German
firms.
According to the philosophy of a capacity-oriented monetary policy, the money
supply should grow with the increase in production capacity in order to ensure
price level stability. Monetary integration implies that the production capacity of
East Germany is added to that of West Germany (indicated by the GNP of DM 2250
bill, in 1989 when overall capacity was highly utilized), so that the money-supply
corridor can shift upward. The production capacity of the GDR is estimated at 10
percent of West Germany's. Consequently, the money supply in the narrow defi-
nition, Ml, (DM 420 bill, in 1989) can increase by DM 42 bill. The larger money
supply, M3, (DM 1255 bill. ) can increase by DM 125 bill.
Monetary assets in the GDR amount to M 253 bill, as of December 31, 1989
(coins and notes M 17 bill. , savings M 162 bill., insurance contracts M 14 bill.,
2
deposits of firms at the GDR central bank amounting to M 60 bill. ) (see Table 2).
Meanwhile, the budget deficit for 1990 is estimated at M 40 bill., indicating still
larger money balances.
The net material product of the GDR is M 273.5 bill. (1989). This number is dis-
torted, however. With the GDR having 26 percent of West Germany's population
the GDR would have a GNP of DM 600 bill, if it produced at the West German
productivity level. If productivity is estimated at only one-third of the West
German level, potential GNP will be roughly DM 200 bill. Since for the partici-
pation rate in East Germany is higher than in West Germany, this number will be
slightly higher. Consequently, the GNP of the GDR can be put at roughly 10
percent of West Germany's.
2
Cash holdings of firms are unknown.Table 2 - Consolidated Balance Sheet of the GDR Banking System as of December 31, 1989 (in M mill. )
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In principle, this amount of M 253 bill, (plus the budget deficit) should be
compared to the permissible increase of M3 (DM 125 bill. ). This implies that mone-
tary assets of M 135 bill, (plus the budget deficit) must be "sterilized", for in-
stance, by being transformed into ownership titles to apartments or firms. Note
that the increase of M3 by DM 125 bill, has the high risk that depending on the
time structure of M3, a consumption spur cannot be excluded. If this risk is to
be excluded, parts of the remaining DM 125 bill, must also be sterilized. A tem-
porary blocking of savings accounts, however, involves the problem that blocked
accounts are near-money, and near-money can be used to finance a spur in con-
sumption.
The agreed upon conversion of all financial assets at the rate of 2:1, except
for M 4000 per head (M 6000 for people older than 59 and M 2000 for those under
15) at the rate of 1:1, implies an increase in M3 of roughly DM 158 bill. (M 64
bill, at the rate of 1:1, the rest of M 253 bill, minus 64 bill., namely, M 189 bill.,
at the of rate 2:1). This would seem to exceed the permissible limit for M3; it
must be made sure that the increase in M3 does not imply an increase of equal size
in Ml. Therefore, part of the increase in M3 should be blocked temporarily.
The problem of whether the increase in the money supply will permit price
level stability is analogous to the question as to what extent purchasing power will
be shifted from West to East Germany. Without transforming part of the assets of
GDR-Mark into property titles (privatization), the agreed upon conversion implies
a transfer of purchasing power to the East. On the commodity markets, if East
German demand favors West German products, aggregate demand for West German
products will increase, creating inflationary pressure in the West. Due to a lack of
demand for East German goods a depression in the East would be possible. We
would then have a split business cycle situation.
The other issue associated with the conversion rate is the competitiveness of
the East German firms. For tradeables, the law of one price applies in a currency
union. This means that East German firms will have to compete with West German
firms as well as internationally - given their present productivity and cost situ-
ation without having the advantage of a variable exchange rate. Consequently, the
question arises how the costs of the firms, namely, wages and capital costs (via
the conversion of debt), are affected by conversion.
It is clear that East Germany cannot have the same wage level as West Ger-
many right away because low wages are in general the only basis for a comparative
advantage for East Germany. One strategy in the conversion of the wage rates
would have been to leave wage setting to the market, similar to the way prices for12
tradeables are specified by market forces. Another approach proposed by some
would have been to use a modest conversion wage as a floor from which market
forces would find the equilibrium wage, including the appropriate wage structure
among firms, sectors, regions and occupations. Such an approach would have al-
lowed a quick differentiation in the wage structure. Moreover, wages could have
increased quickly together with the productivity gains; wages would also have
been increased to attract labor into new firms (wage drift). Using a cautious con-
version wage as a floor would have come close to a market process of wage for-
mation. However, the 1:1 conversion of wages poses the problem of whether the
majority of the GDR firms will be competitive.
The competitiveness of East German firms will also be affected by the conver-
sion of firms' gross debt with the central bank (M 260 bill. ). Even at the conver-
sion rate of 2:1, the competitiveness of firms will be affected. If different rates of
conversion are applied for savings and for debts, equalization claims will have to
be established. These claims will be defined against the assets of the GDR, but
they may eventually be an expenditure item in the West German budget.
The conversion rate defines the amount of public transfers needed to correct
"structural" problems. In a scenario where one can use the exchange rate as a
shock absorber for GDR industry, the political demand for government transfers
will be relatively low. In a scenario of a quick monetary union with a favorable
rate to the GDR saver and wage earner, the lacking competitiveness of East
German industry will manifest itself in greater structural problems, including un-
employment, and a more extended transfer scheme will be required. Moreover, the
equalization claims arising from the different conversion rates for savings and
debts might be a burden on the budget of the political union.
5. Real Economic Integration
Institutional and monetary integration will influence the economic decisions of
households and firms which in turn will bring about economic integration in the
real sphere of the economy. From an allocation point of view, the economic inte-
gration of the two Germanies can be viewed as the integration of two economies
The proposal was the formula "1:2 plus x" where the conversion wage would
have been converted on a 2:1 basis after wages in GDR-Mark had been raised by
an amount x (M 200-300) to compensate for the rise in prices of subsidized pro-
ducts and for higher social insurance contributions [ Siebert, 1990g ].13
which have different sectorial structures and which are at different levels of
development. More specifically, economic integration can be interpreted as the
addion of qualified labor, land and a partially obsolete capital stock to the West
German economy. Eventually the capital stock per worker in the area of the GDR
will reach the West German level and the economic structure will tend to equalize.
The paradigm to be applied for the analysis of the integration process has to
include the following three elements:
(i) From the point of view of integration theory, two economies merge and ex-
ploit comparative advantages. Trade will be created and diverted. In the
context of the Helpman-Krugman approach [ 1985], economies of scale and
product qualities influencing a firm's market share play a role.
(ii) Mobility of capital will be an important vehicle of adjustment, which implies
frequent changes in comparative advantage in the transitional period. Capital
will come in all forms, such as portfolio capital, direct investment, mergers
and acquisitions and joint ventures. Mobility of labor has to be included as
well because migration may increase if living conditions (including employ-
ment opportunities) are too divergent.
(iii) Starting at a low productivity level and an obsolete capital stock there will
be a Schumpeterian growth process fuelled by capital and technology trans-
fer, the founding of new firms and an organizational restructuring of in-
dustry.
The capital stock of GDR industry is largely obsolete. This is due to a num-
ber of reasons. First, the capital goods (equipment and buildings) are old. Ac-
cording to unofficial sources, 76 percent of the equipment in industry is older
than 5 years, 54.9 percent older than 10 years, and 21.1 percent older than 20
2
years. In the machine producing industry, 56.3 percent of the equipment is older
than 10 years. The capital stock is geared towards distorted environmental and
energy costs. Vintage damages represent a high burden on the future for specific
industries. Moreover, the capital stock was oriented to the COMECON, an external
market with many distortions; hence many products cannot compete internationally
because of their poor quality.
The Institut fur Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft [1990, p. 8] claims that the
GDR sectors are characterized by low labor productivity and a high capital stock
per employee, which implies inefficiency.
2
Slightly different data are given by the Institut fur Internationale Politik und
Wirtschaft [1990, Table 7]. For infrastructure capital, the figures are even
worse: 45. 1 percent of the equipment in the postal and communication services is
older than 20 years.14
It is nearly impossible to calculate the capital needed to modernize East German
industry. A crude procedure is to apply the West German capital /output coefficient
of 2.1 for the goods-producing sectors (mining, manufacturing, construction and
electricity, gas and water), and of 4.6 for the total economy (including infra-
structure). Assuming that East Germany will eventually produce with the same
labor productivity and a similar sectorial structure, the East German capital stock
can be adjusted by correcting the capital stock of the Federal Republic by the
GDR population which is only 26 percent of the population in the Federal Republic
(see Table 3). Neglecting the growth process and using 1989 data, the comparable
Table 3 - Capital Stock and Investment in East Germany and West Germany
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West German capital stock in 1989. - (b) In-
:) New construction and modernization. - (d)
i) Capital stock at 1986 prices.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [1989]; Staatliche Zentralverwaltung [1989]; own
estimates.15
East German capital stock for 1989 would be DM 498 bill. (FRG: DM 1917 bill. ) for
the goods-producing sectors, DM 1148 bill. (FRG: DM 4416 bill. ) for all enter-
prises (not including housing) and DM 2789 bill. (FRG: DM 10725 bill.) for the
total economy. In order to determine the capital requirement, it has to be
estimated to what extent the existing capital stock is obsolete. If 50 percent of the
stock can be used, the capital requirement for all firms would amount to DM 574
bill., in the extreme case of zero percent, the figure will be double this. It seems
that investment of this size can be undertaken over a series of years and be
financed by private capital.
The sector structure of the GDR is biased in favor of manufacturing and
against services. 40.2 percent of total employment is in manufacturing and the
goods-producing crafts, while this relation is 33.6 in West Germany (Table 4).
Whereas the Federal Republic has reduced employment in manufacturing from 10
(1970) to 8 million (1989), the GDR has increased it from 2.9 to 3.4 million during
the same time period.
The trade structure of the GDR is distorted, too. In 1988, 69. 4 percent of its
exports went to the COMECON countries (the figure for West Germany is 4.5; see
Table 5). This is the result of the intra-bloc specialization philosophy of the
COMECON. Moreover, the GDR has followed an import substitution strategy aiming
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underestimated by 2-3 per-
security personnel.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [1989]; Staatliche Zentralverwaltung [1989].
Assuming a capital requirement of DM 1148 bill, (complete obsoleteness), over a
ten-year period annual investment must be DM 114. 8 bill.16
Table 5 - Export Shares of East Germany and West Germany by Goods and














































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [1989]; Staatliche Zentralverwaltung fur Statistik
[1989].
at establishing an industrial base similar to that of West Germany. It attempted to
produce the product set of the world economy. Its structure in basic industry,
which historically used to be a complement to West Germany's structure became
more and more a replica of the West German mold, albeit on a less efficient level.
Exports of the GDR to the market economies are biased in favor of natural re-
sources and against manufactured and consumer goods.
The share of exports in the GNP for the GDR is estimated at 25 percent. This
is low for a small open economy. If the international division of labor were given
its full scope in the GDR, one would expect the GDR to have an export share
similar to that of countries of comparable size, i. e., in the range of 50 percent.
This gap in the export shares indicates the magnitude of the transformation of the
economy that has to be performed.
The GDR will experience a process of structural change similar to other
European countries, only with less time available for adjustments. Ailing in-
dustries, which are no longer competitive on the international markets, such as
shipbuilding and parts of the steel and textile industry, will be a policy problem.
Pollution- and energy-intensive sectors will have to adjust. New products
satisfying international demand will have to be developed. The underdeveloped
service sector will have to expand considerably. The size of the structural ad-
justment needed is the result of the distortions arising from central planning.
For instance, the Netherlands have an export share of 54 percent.17
The impact of economic integration on intra-German trade flows will be deter-
mined by the principles of comparative advantage. In the short-term scenario the
GDR will have a locational advantage for industries with lower wages for qualified
labor; in the long run, its comparative advantage will result from the availability
of qualified labor, technical skills and, relative to agglomeration centers in the
West, the availability of space for the location of firms.
If plant-specific economies of scale and product qualities are relevant for the
market share of firms [Helpman, Krugman, 1985], there is a tendency to increase
production at the original location. This would imply that West German firms, being
still able to reduce their average costs, have not yet reached their optimal pro-
duction point. They also have an advantage because of their brand names. In the
context of the theory of market entry, West German firms may have the advantage
of an early market entry. These aspects point to a production bias for West
German firms, at least initially. Moreover, West German firms will acquire East
German units so that intra-German trade has to be explained as intra-firm trade.
If economies of scale are industry-specific or if they extend to the whole nation or
beyond, East German firms will eventually be integrated into the division of labor
among firms.
In the adjustment process, capital and technology will be transferred to the
GDR, with the transfer of technology shifting the marginal capital productivity
curve for the GDR, F^-* in Figure 1, upward over time. The total German capital
stock is indicated by OO* in the initial situation, with the West German capital
stock denoted by ON and the East German capital stock by NO*. Initially, the two
capital markets are segmented and the marginal capital productivity in the GDR is
lower (point A* relative to A). Point A indicates the given world interest rate. In
the intermediate situation (point M), the real interest rate may be higher than
initially and the world interest rate may have been driven up. In the long-run
equilibrium (point A), the marginal capital productivities in the GDR and the FRG
will be equated. Over time, capital will have flowed from the West (including the
western world) to the GDR, increasing the capital stock of the GDR by 0*0*'.
The economic integration of the two Germanies can be considered to fuse the
two endowment boxes OAO'B and O'CO*D where West Germany is relatively capital
abundant and East Germany relatively rich in labor (and land) as shown in Figure
2. The original points of specialization are M and N respectively, with k_ > k-,
For a similar argument in another context, see Krugman, Venables [1990].18








Figure 2 - Integration, Factor Endowment, and Trade
FIGURE 219
k. > k.*, and 1/r > l*/r*. In the intermediate period, the point of specialization of
the integrated economy is M', with the wage/interest ratio falling in the West and
rising in the East, thus driving down the capital intensity in the West and in-
creasing it in the East. In the intermediate position, the real interest rate may be
higher than initially, and the world interest rate may have been driven up. In the
long run (point L), the capital endowment of the GDR will increase (O*O*'). For
simplicity it has been assumed that the same wage/interest ratio will prevail as
initially. The interest rate will come down, the wage/interest ratio will rise, and
production will become more capital-intensive. Relative to the initial situation, the
production of commodities 1 and 2 will have increased.
It can be expected that the eastern part of Germany will quickly catch up
and, with the right kind of reforms, two-digit real growth rates are likely. As a
reminder, after the monetary reform of 1948 in West Germany, the index of indus-
trial production rose by 50 percent in the first five months on an annual basis
[Wallich, 1955, p. 33], and annual growth rates of real GNP reached 20 percent
during the period 1949-1951. Admittedly, the situation in the GDR differs in many
respects from that of West Germany in 1948, but both cases are characterized by a
rich pool of qualified labor and a capital shortage: in 1948, because the capital
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stock was partly destroyed by the war; now, because the capital stock of the
GDR is obsolete in economic and ecological terms.
Growth theory predicts, and historical experience confirms that countries with
similar technical skills and technology as well as a relatively low capital stock per
head have a lower output level initially, but also high growth rates [ Barro, 1987].
Table 6 shows the growth rates of nine industrialized countries during the period
1950-1985 (see also Figure 3). Countries whose capital stock was destroyed by the
See Wallich [ 1955, p. 34] GNP growth rates for West Germany: 1949, second half
18.7 percent; 1950, first half 13.5 percent, second half 19.6 percent; 1951, first
half 20.6 percent, second half 9.5 percent. All data at constant 1936 prices;
GNP-data not available prior to 1949.
2
The amount of destruction of the German capital stock after the war is debated
in the literature [Gundlach, 1987].
The growth rates of real GDP in the four industrialized countries for the period
1945-1949 are as follows: West Germany 48.3; Japan 7.7; United Kingdom 0.6,
and United States -2.3. The German data are based on an index of industrial
production and refer to the British and American zone only. The figure given is
the average of the three annual growth rates of 12 percent (1946I-1947I), 56
percent (1947I-1948I), and 77 percent (1947IV-1948IV). The data for Germany
are from Gundlach [1987, Table Al], for Japan from the Bank of Japan [1966,
Table 9], for the United Kingdom from Mitchell [1988, pp. 840-841], and for the
United States from the U.S. Department of Commerce [1976, Table Fl-5].20


































































































































Source: Barro [1987, p. 296]; Summers, Heston [1988].
war experienced high growth rates (West Germany 7.5 percent; Italy 5.7 percent;
Japan 8.1 percent) during the period 1950-1960. High growth rates were ac-
companied by a high investment ratio. On the other hand, countries with a capital21
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(a) Five-year average of percentage changes over the previous year.
1979-1985
endowment not so much affected by the war had lower growth rates (United States
3.2 percent; United Kingdom 2.6 percent) and a lower investment ratio.
If West Germany's experience with high growth rates after the 1948 reform can
be partially applied to East Germany, East Germany should be able to reach 50
percent of the West German per capita income level in 2. 4 years and 70 percent in
6.9 years (Table 7). In order to arrive at these figures, the following assumptions
were made. The GDR starts from a low GNP of DM 200 bill. - roughly one-tenth of
West Germany's. This places income per head at roughly 33 percent of West
2
Germany's. For West Germany, a growth rate of 2 percent is assumed. In the
take-off scenario A, a real growth rate of the GDR of 25 percent in the first year,
20 in the second and 15 in the third year is assumed, decreasing to 10 percent in
With capital accumulation, growth rates decline.
In 1989 the GDR population was 26 percent of West Germany's.22
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the next two years and then 9, 8 and subsequently 7 percent. For the outcome of
this scenario as well as that of other scenarios the reader is referred to Table 7.
In the transitional period, unemployment in Eastern Germany is likely. Fore-
casts of unemployment differ widely, and it is extremely difficult to estimate the
potential size of unemployment. It will depend on the dynamics of the
Schumpeterian growth process, especially on the speed with which new and small
firms are opened up.
A caveat to the optimistic scenario should, however, be mentioned. There is a
risk that the economic integration of the two Germanies will not be brought about
by market forces but by the political process. There is no doubt that the political
process, for instance, the negotiation of the treaty between the two Germanies,
must define institutional integration. However, real economic integration should be
brought about by market forces. In the case of converting the two currencies and
wages, the political process has not relied on market forces to determine the con-
version rate for currencies and to find the equilibrium wage, including the equilib-
rium wage structure. Now, there is a definite risk that the political process will
dominate the privatization of firms and sectorial adjustment. Moreover, there is a
stray political demand for the structural protection of the GDR industry. The as-
pirations of the inhabitants of the GDR are high, resulting in a political demand
for quick improvements in income, environmental quality, housing, social security
and physical infrastructure. There seems to be a belief that government policy can
Estimates range from 970000 (DIW according to Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
April 26, 1990) and 1. 5 million [ Institut fur Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft,
1990] to 3.5 million [Hoffmann, 1990].23
solve these issues quickly. In this respect, the analogy to 1948 no longer holds.
If these political demands are allowed to influence the course of events and if they
dominate the market process, prices will be politicized. In this case, structural
changes in the GDR will take place along similar lines to West Germany's experi-
ence with the sectional policy for ailing industries. Then, there is no reason for
an optimistic scenario. This also holds when the increase in wages is not steered
by market forces, especially by the increase in productivity, but by political bar-
gaining .
Government transfers from West to East Germany will be needed for four dif-
ferent purposes:
- for building up the social overhead capital in the GDR,
- for improving the environmental situation,
- for contributing to the social security system in the transitional phase, and
- for alleviating structural problems resulting from a lack of competitiveness of the
GDR industry.
It is extremely difficult to estimate the amount of transfer needed. The five
major German economic research institutes have estimated the budget deficit of East
Germany in 1991 at DM 43 bill. Government revenue amounting to DM 37 bill, relies
mainly on the value-added tax and on excise taxes. Expenditures of DM 80 bill,
include 23 bill, for government employees, 20 bill, for subsidies, mainly to agri-
culture, and 20 bill, for transfers to private households. Additional costs of
roughly DM 25 bill, will have to be taken over by the West German budget, to-
gether with infrastructure outlays in East Germany in the range of DM 10 bill.,
initial financing of the social security system (old age pensions, unemployment) of
DM 13 bill., thus bringing the total financial burden to DM 65-70 bill. For these
calculations it has been assumed that equalization claims will be offset by the
privatization of apartments and firms. In addition to transfers to East Germany,
the West German budget will have to take over the GDR's foreign debt of DM 40
bill. Note that part of the financial burden on the West German budget can be
financed by a reshuffling of expenditures and by an increase in tax revenue due
2
to economic growth. Eventually economic expansion in East Germany as well will
bring about an increase in tax revenue.
Nor does it hold for Poland and Hungary.
2
In 1989, the increase in tax revenue was DM 47 bill. However, this was influenc-
ed by an increase in excise taxes (DM 10 bill. ), whereas the 1990 tax reform will
reduce the increase in tax revenue.24
Public transfers may be interpreted as the cost of economic integration to the
West German taxpayer, but these costs will only arise in the transitional period.
For the country as a whole, especially after the transitional period, there will be
benefits from an increase in the division of labor within Germany.
Unification will be a growth stimulus. Economic integration of Germany can be
viewed as an investment opportunity, a new frontier in the sense of Hansen [ 1955]
or a Schumpeterian event. The benefits expected from "Europe '92" will arise in a
similar way for the two Germanies, and integration benefits will be relatively high
because the potential for benefits is high due to large initial distortions.
6. International Implications
Private capital will flow into East Germany, implying that German investment in
the whole will be attracted by East Germany. There will also be public transfers
from the West to the East. Moreover, capital flows in Europe will be shifted to the
German union in the transitional period. Capital exports from West Germany, which
amounted to DM 118 bill, in 1989 (DM 120 bill, in 1988), will be reduced. It can be
expected that the real interest rate will be driven up because the marginal ef-
ficiency of capital in East Germany has increased and new investment opportunities
are opening up. This implies that borrowing will become more expensive elsewhere
in the world.
East Germany, being a net importer of capital in the transitional period, will
have a balance of trade deficit. The other side of the coin to the surplus in the
capital account (i.e., of net capital imports) is the trade deficit. The trade deficit
will be caused by the import of investment goods, but it will also stem from the
import of consumption goods which in turn are a function of the purchasing power
transferred due to the conversion of the GDR-Mark. East Germany's negative trade
balance implies that the overall German trade surplus and German capital exports
will be reduced.
The economic integration of the two Germanies will be a growth stimulus for
both Germanies, for Europe and for the world economy. With the German trade
surplus being reduced in the transitional period, Germany's demand for other
countries' exports will increase. Europe, the United States and other countries will
experience an increase in the demand for their exportables. The US trade deficit
will be reduced; at the same time capital inflows into the United States will be
smaller.25
From the supply side, there should be an appreciation of the D-Mark, assum-
ing that inflationary dangers due to conversion can be prevented. This appreci-
ation is due to a higher marginal efficiency of capital, i. e. higher rates of return
in East Germany, to a larger capital inflow (reduced capital outflow out of the
D-Mark area) and to an increased demand for the D-Mark; the appreciation is a
vehicle to bring about a reduction in the overall German trade surplus.
In a context of tradeables and non-tradeables, the D-Mark will appreciate as
well. In such a context the price for tradeables will be given by the world market;
the price for non-tradeables will rise for a number of reasons: The income transfer
to East Germany will increase the demand for non-tradeables, supply-side growth
will lead to an increase in income, again raising the demand for non-tradeables,
and infrastructure outlays in East Germany will increase the demand for non-trade-
ables. All these forces will raise internal absorption. Moreover, wages and conse-
quently production costs for non-tradeables will rise; price controls on non-trade-
ables will be lifted. At the same time, the transformation function between trade-
ables and non-tradeables will shift upward due to productivity gains and capital
inflow. The bias in the shift in the transformation curve will influence the oppor-
tunity costs of producing non-tradeables. This supply-side effect may counteract
the impact of the increase in absorption on the relative price of non-tradeables. It
would be sufficient for an increase in the opportunity costs of non-tradeables if
the shift in the transformation function is neutral or if it is biased in favor of
tradeables. Then the price of non-tradeables would rise from the production side.
Under this condition the relative price between non-tradeables and tradeables
rises, implying an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
The German economic union should be embedded into the EC framework. This
means that East Germany should participate in the free flow of people, goods, ser-
vices and capital in the EC. With the EC applying institutional competition as the
basic strategy for integration, the transitional period of the German integration
process should not be too difficult from the European point of view. Moreover, in-
tegration benefits will be increased for the EC as a whole, with East Germany con-
stituting part of the larger market. Within the EC, investment in East Germany will
compete with investment in Mediterranean countries. Moreover, the argument that
non-EC-member countries would suffer from trade diversion should be taken
seriously, but not overrated. Such static effects of integration are small in quanti-
tative terms and will soon be outweighed by positive dynamic effects from which
nonmember countries will benefit, too.26
On the monetary side, the GMU (German Monetary Union) should not disturb
the prospects for the EMU (European Monetary Union). The tendency for an ap-
preciation of the D-Mark will put pressure on the EMS for a realignment. Without
realignment, the EMS countries will experience an increase in the interest rate.
This pressure for realignment will arise from the forces in the real economy such
as supply-side income growth, increased internal absorption and capital inflow into
Germany.
In order to avoid additional impacts of the economic integration of the two
Germanies on EMU it is important that the conversion of GDR-Mark does not violate
price level stability in the new currency area. If this condition is satisfied, GMU
and EMU are somewhat uncoupled, at least from the monetary side. If, however,
the conversion rate and the modalities of the conversion are such that price level
stability in the German economic union becomes an issue, different scenarios are
possible. If the inflation rate is not controlled by the Bundesbank, the expected
inflation rate will imply a depreciation of the D-Mark, counteracting the appreci-
ation tendency from the real side of the economy for a while. If expectations are
not rational and if commodity prices are sticky, a nominal overshooting in the
D-Mark rate is possible in a Branson-Dornbusch context. If the Bundesbank at-
tempts to control the inflation rate, it will have to raise the interest rate in ad-
dition to the supply-side rise in the interest rates, and there will be additional
pressure for a realignment in the EMS. Moreover, there could be a severe risk of
a German recession with a high interest rate.
The additional pressure for realignment in the European monetary union may
make it more difficult to implement EMU more quickly. First, capital (portfolio as
well as risk capital) originating from nonmember countries will move into the EC
rather than into countries having a resource endowment similar to that of the
GDR. Thus, the ECU will be expected to appreciate against the Dollar area, thus
contributing to a reduction in the imbalances in the current account of the EC and
the United States. Second, within the EC, capital will move from the Mediterranean
countries and the United Kingdom (the major host for non-EC risk capital during
the eighties) to Continental Europe, particularly to the GMU area, thereby exert-
ing depreciation pressures upon the pound sterling. This may fuel inflationary
tendencies in the United Kingdom and impede the accession of the United Kingdom
to the EMU unless the United Kingdom succeeds in reducing internal absorption.
Note that the attempt of the United Kingdom to bring down the interest rate may
be affected by the German situation.27
One can argue from an economic point of view that the integration of all EC cur-
rencies into the EMU will be delayed rather than accelerated due to the formation
of a GMU.
With economic reforms taking place in Eastern Europe, the issue arises as to
what extent and in which forms the EC can open up to the Eastern European coun-
tries which are in the process of leaving the COMECON. To link the remaining
COMECON countries to the EC institutionally, it is crucial to discipline any vested
interests in the EMU/GMU which aim via discriminatory treatment at replacing im-
ports from these COMECON countries with imports from the GDR. We can envision
free trade agreements between the EC and individual countries for specific sectors
similar to the 1973 free trade agreement with EFTA in manufacturing. Conceivably
some Eastern European countries may join the EFTA [Kostrzewa, Schmieding, 1989]
or form another economic union that is associated with the EC.
Economic integration of greater Europe involves a risk for the world economy
that there will be a move away from multilateralism towards the concept of the
world economy as a triad where strategic behavior may be a dominant character-
istic. It is somewhat ironic that the liberalization process in Eastern Europe has
discovered the merits of the free market and is moving away from a philosophy of
planned specialization among countries by international cooperation whereas new
theoretical, albeit naive, approaches in international economics from the United
States seem to suggest a new era of managed trade. Our aim must be to develop a
multilateral institutional arrangement for the world economy in which economic de-
cisions are decentralized.28
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